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LABOR LAW-RECENT DECISIONS
ON JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS
I. NLRB DECLINATION AND STATE COURT JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has held that the National Labor Relations Act
bestows upon the National Labor Relations Board the fullest power that
Congress possesses under the commerce clause of the Constitution. 1 Since
its inception, however, the Board has chosen not to exercise that power to
its fullest extent. At first on a case-by-case basis 2 and later under codified
jurisdictional standards 3 the Board has declined jurisdiction over those
labor disputes which affect interstate commerce only slightly. When, in a
1957 series of cases, 4 the Supreme Court held that section 10(a) of the
NLRAa impliedly excluded the states from regulating any labor dispute
within the jurisdictional power of the Board, there was created a class of
cases, aptly characterized as "no-man's land," for which no forum was
available. That class included all those cases which affected interstate com-
merce so slightly that the Board would decline jurisdiction, but which the
states were powerless to treat as a result of the Supreme Court's decisions.
It has been estimated that a substantial percentage of labor disputes fell free
of any labor regulation as a result of the Board's policy of declination and
the Court's decisions.'
To clarify the Board's power to decline jurisdiction and to reestablish
regulation over labor disputes in the no-man's land,? Congress passed sec-
tion 14(c) of the NLRA in 1959. That section provides:
The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by
published rules adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act, decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving
any class or category of employees, where, in the opinion of the
Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not suf-
ficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction . . . .
Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to prevent or to bar any
agency or the courts of any State or Territory. . . , from assuming
and asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the Board
declines, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, to assert
jurisdiction. 8
1
 NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951) ; NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S.
601 (1939).
2 See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); 16 NLRB Ann. Rep. 15
(1951).
23 NLRB Ann. Rep. 8-12 (1958).
4 Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957) ; Amalgamated Meat Cutters
Local 427 v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
5 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964).
Stephens, The No Man's Land of Labor Relations Remains Unoccupied, 14 Lab.
L.J. 192, 193 (1963).
7 See McCoid, Notes on a "G-String": A Study of the "No Man's Land" of Labor
Law, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 205, 230-37 (1959).
8 29 U.S.C. §§ 164(c)(1), (2) (1964).
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Section 14(c) unequivocally establishes the power of the states to regulate
when the Board disavows the exercise of jurisdiction because of insubstantial
interstate commerce. However, whether an actual declination of jurisdic-
tion by the Board in each case is prerequisite to the assertion of state power
is a question which has divided the courts that have passed on it.°
In Stryjewski v. Local 830, Brewery & Beer Distrib, Drivers,10 the
defendant local union picketed the plaintiff husband and wife's nonunion
beer distributorship. The plaintiffs sought an injunction and damages in a
Pennsylvania district court. The union argued that the state court was
without jurisdiction because the dispute was within the Board's jurisdictional
power and the Board had not actually declined jurisdiction. The plaintiffs
argued that no actual declination by the Board was necessary under section
14(c) (2), and that the Board, if given the opportunity, would have declined
jurisdiction. The district court denied the relief sought. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court assumed that the Board would have declined jurisdiction, 1 '
but nevertheless affirmed the district court. In a four to two decision, the
court held that state courts lack jurisdiction over labor disputes which fall
well below the Board's jurisdictional standards, but which the Board has
not actually declined.
The majority in Stryjewski based its holding on the paramount federal
interest in the uniform regulation of labor disputes which affect interstate
commerce. They felt that disparity in the ascertainment and application of
Board jurisdictional standards could be avoided only by investing the Board
with authority to make all initial decisions respecting jurisdictional issues.' 2
The dissenters, on the other hand, determined that the language and history
of section 14(c) and the necessity for speed in finding a forum for the settle-
ment of labor disputes compelled a conclusion that no actual declination by
the Board was necessary."
Although the position of the majority in Stryjewski is a minority one,"
it is not without merit. In view of the somewhat complex process by which
the Board measures the quantum of interstate activity in many industries,"
the Board may well be more suited than the state courts to resolve jurisdic-
tional questions. The mere fact that one legal institution, rather than 50, would
9 Compare Russell v. Electrical Workers Local 569, 64 Cal. 2d 22, 409 P.2d 926, 48
Cal. Rptr. 702 (1966), Local 227, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fleischaker, 384
S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1964), and Guiliano v. Local 830, Teamsters, 34 Pa. D. & C. 2d 512
(Delaware County C.P. 1964), with Barksdale & LeBlanc v. Local 130, Elec. Workers,
143 So. 2d 770 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
10 426 Pa. 512, 233 A.2d 264 (1967), noted in 9 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 800 (1968).
11 The Board would have declined jurisdiction either because the plaintiff's only
employee was their son, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964), or because the dollar volume of gross
sales of the distributorship per annum was $270,000 below the Board's applicable jurisdic-
tional standard. Carolina Supplies & Cement Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 88, 43 L.R.R.M. 1060
(1958).
• 12 426 Pa. at 519, 233 A.2d at 268.
13 Chief Justice Bell, id., 233 A.2d at 268, and Justice Roberts, id. at 522, 233 A.2d
at 269, filed separate dissenting opinions.
14 See cases cited note 9 supra.
15 Note, 80 Harr. L. Rev. 1600, 1603-04 (1967).
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be invested with initial decisional prerogatives suggests both consistency and
uniformity in the development of jurisdictional principles 1 6 Furthermore,
the availability of the advisory opinion procedure,'' by which the Board will
advise interested parties, state agencies, or state courts on disputed jurisdic-
tional questions, may indicate that the Board itself prefers jurisdictional
issues to be submitted initially twit. Finally, the fact that the Board, even
after the enactment of section 14(c), possesses the fullest jurisdictional power
and may take jurisdiction over cases which fall below its own standards,13 in
order to further some legislative purpose or to reach conscious labor violators
in unregulated states, provides another reason for giving to the Board the
initial jurisdictional decision.19
On the other hand, there are compelling reasons which support the dis-
senting judges in their belief that state courts need not await an actual
declination before assuming jurisdiction. The context in which section 14(c)
was passed indicates that the statute was intended to eliminate the "no-man's
land" created by the 1957 Supreme Court decisions by investing state courts
with jurisdiction over labor disputes affecting interstate commerce and either
retrospectively or prospectively declined by the Board. 2° The language of
section 14(c) (1) which permits Board declination either by rules of decision
or by published rules, 2 ' and the language which allows declination of jurisdic-
tion over any class or category of employers 22 is expressly incorporated into
section 14(c) (2), which is the state-empowering section of the statute. More-
over, section 14(c)'s purpose of effectively, and hence speedily, settling
disputes is inhibited by requiring actual declination. Often a lengthy period of
time is required for the processing of disputes through the Board. 23 The
processing of jurisdictional questions through the Board, which the actual
declination rule mandates, may well "perpetuate the very `no-man's land'
which Congress sought to abolish . . . "724 The advisory opinion procedure
16 Note, 9 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 800, 807 (1968).
17 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.39-A3, 102.98-.110 (1967).
18 Section 14(c)(1) mandates only that the Board cannot refuse to take cases
which it would have taken under its 1959 standards. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1964). The
Board cannot, hence, decrease its jurisdiction below the 1959 standards. The Board can,
however, increase its jurisdiction to the fullest possible number of cases affecting interstate
commerce, if it so choses. For budgetary reasons, the Board has not so chosen. Summary
of Operations of NLRB General Counsel, 60 L.R.R.M. 110 (1966).
19 The Board may fee! that the principle of uniform and consistent development of
jurisdictional standards should be sacrificed to afford statutory coverage to a particular
labor dispute.
20 See Merrifield, Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations Law, 29 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 318, 329 (1960).
21 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1) (1964) states in pertinent part: "The Board . . . may, by
rule of decision or by published rules adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act ...."
22 29
	 § 164(c)(1) (1964) states in pertinent part: ". . . decline to assert
jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or category of employees."
23 Beeson, Boundaries of State-Federal Jurisdiction in Labor-Management Relations
Under the New Labor Law—A Federal View, in N.Y.U. 13th Ann. Conf. on Labor 51,
64 (M. Stein, ed. 1960).
24 426 Pa. at 522, 233 A.2d at 269 (dissenting opinion, Roberts, I.).
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gives little realistic relief to the burden created by the actual declination
rule. It too requires time, and, because it lacks legally binding effect, does
not constitute an actual declination. 25 Finally, in attitude toward section
14(c) (2), the Supreme Court appears to accept initial state court jurisdic-
tional decisions."
By the careful exercise of state court discretion and Board administrative
process, the seemingly polar positions of the majority and dissents in
Stryjewski can be accommodated, and the dual aims of the NLRA to establish
uniform labor jurisdictional law and to provide readily available forums for
labor disputes can be satisfied. First, in all cases in which there is any doubt,
however slight, that the Board may wish to take jurisdiction, the state courts
should defer from deciding the jurisdictional question, even if the Board's
standards are not rnet.27 A nonexhaustive list of such cases includes: (a)
cases involving joint employers or integrated industries; 28 (b) cases involv-
ing the computation of the inflow and outflow of interstate commerce;" (c)
cases involving secondary activity in which the secondary employers may or
may not be included in the computation of interstate commerce; 3° (d) cases
in which the Board has established jurisdictional standards on a case-by-case
basis; 3 ' (e) cases where the Board's standards are not met, but there is a
history of flagrant violations in the industry or by the particular employer.
Second, in those cases which the state courts do transfer to the Board, and
which require immediate response, the Board should act with speed—either
accepting and docketing a case or refusing it. If necessary, an administra-
tive priority should be established by which jurisdictional issues would be
given immediate attention. 32
 Third, in all cases in which there is no doubt
that the Board would decline jurisdiction, the time-consuming process of
transfer to the Board and actual declination should be eliminated, and the
state courts should as a consequence have immediate jurisdiction.
II. FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JURISDICTION OVER NLRB PROCEEDINGS
A. Federal Commerce Jurisdiction and NLRB Proceedings
Representation hearings and certification elections pursuant to Section
9 of the NLRA are judicially reviewable only if, subsequent to the hearing
and election, the party asserting the representational defect commits an
unfair labor practice, usually a refusal to bargain, and thereby causes the
NLRB to examine the representational matter through the mechanism of
the unfair-labor-practice proceeding.33 Any person aggrieved by the Board's
25
 Hirsch v. McCulloch, 303 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
26 Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local 1264 v. Broadcast Scrv., 380 U.S.
255 {1965); Hattiesburg Bldg. & Trades Council v. Broome, 377 U.S. 126 (1964).
27 See note 18 supra.
28 See Beeson, supra note 23, at 62.
29 Raybern Bus. Serv., Inc., 128 N.L.R.B. 430 (1960).
80
 Electrical Workers, Local 25, 148 N.L.R.B. 1560 (1964); 1 CCH Lab. L. Rep.
(Lab. Rd.) § 1610.6711 at 5449 (1968).
31 NLRB v. Pease Oil Co., 279 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1960).
32 Cf. 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(0, (m) (1964).
33 29 U.S.C. § 159(d) (1964).
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unfair-labor-practice order may then obtain judicial review of the underlying
representational question in the appropriate circuit court of appeals." 4
 The
NRLA nowhere gives a party aggrieved by a Board representational decision
access to the federal district courts. Nevertheless, three principal cases,
Leedom v. Kyne,35
 Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras v. McCul-
loch,"a and Fay v. Douds,27
 have established that in exceptional circum-
stances the federal district courts may exercise their general federal commerce
jurisdiction"" over Board representation and certification decisions.
In Leedom, the Board certified a bargaining unit composed of profes-
sional and nonprofessional employees without obtaining the polled consent of
the professionals required by the statute."" The Supreme Court endorsed
district court jurisdiction to vacate a Board determination which (1) violated
the command of the NLRA to poll professionals before including them in a
mixed unit with nonprofessionals and (2) could not have been judicially con-
sidered by any other procedure within the control of those aggrieved, the
professional employees. In McCulloch, the Board asserted jurisdiction in a
representation case involving the foreign crewmen of a foreign flag-ship with
limited American contacts. The Supreme Court again allowed district court
jurisdiction, in order to enjoin the Board's statutorily unwarranted assump-
tion of jurisdiction. The Court stated its rationale as follows: "IT he pre-
sence of public questions particularly high in the scale of our national
interest because of their international complexion is a uniquely compelling
justification for prompt judicial resolution of the controversy over the Board's
power."4 ° Thus, while the Board's violation of the NLRA was not as clear
in McCulloch as it had been in Leedom, the public interest involved in
McCulloch was important enough to justify immediate federal court
jurisdiction.
In Fay v. Douds, the Board denied opportunity to be heard and
recognitional status on the ballot to an intervening union. The union's peti-
tion for injunctive relief in the federal district court, alleging a violation by
the Board of fifth amendment due process, was denied. The Second Circuit,
speaking through Judge L. Hand, held that "a not transparently frivolous
assertion" of constitutional deprivation gives jurisdiction to the district courts
and constitutes an exception to the otherwise exclusive review format of the
NLRA. Thus, constitutional violations need not be as clear as violations of
statutory mandate in order to confer district court jurisdiction. Furthermore,
it should be noted that the petitioning union in Fay had no other procedural
means within its control of raising its constitutional objections.
34
 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964). See American Fed'n of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401
(1940),
:15
 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
26
 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
37
 172 F.2d 720, 23 L.R.R.M. 2356 (2d Cir. 1949).
38 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1964).
39
 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1) (1964), provides: "the Board shall not (I) decide that any
unit is appropriate for (the purposes of collective bargaining) . . if such unit includes
both professional employees and employees who are not professional employees unless a
majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit."
49 372 U.S. at 17.
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Because district court jurisdiction is an exception to the statutory scheme
of the NLRA, and because the Supreme Court has indicated the desirability of
preserving the narrowness of that exception, 41 the district courts have gen-
erally refrained from expansive readings of Leedom, McCulloch, and Fay. It
is unmistakably clear that unless a matter of compelling international
interest is involved, a federal district court will not exercise general federal
commerce jurisdiction absent either clear violation of a statutory mandate
or a plausible claim of constitutional violation. In either case, moreover,
other avenues of review must be beyond the control of the parties aggrieved
by the Board's representation decisions.
Of the many district court jurisdictional cases decided during the past
year, only one permitted jurisdiction. IUE v. NLRB 42
 concerned the conduct
of a Board agent during a certification election. Between the afternoon and
evening polling periods of a "split election," 43
 the Board agent in charge
was observed drinking beer with the petitioning union's representative. 44
When the union won the election, the employer petitioned the Board to set
the election aside. The Board did so, in order to preserve confidence in the
"laboratory conditions" of its election process. The Board acknowledged that
the conduct of its agent did not and could not have had any adverse effect on
the election result or the ballots cast in the evening session, but held that
the commission of an act by a Board agent conducting an election
which tends to destroy confidence in the Board's election process, or
which could reasonably be interpreted as impugning the election
standards we seek to maintain, is a sufficient basis for setting aside
that election.45
The union then initiated an injunction proceeding in a district court claiming
that the court should take jurisdiction because (1) the Board violated
section 9(c) (1) of the NLRA, 45 and (2) there was no other way for the
union to obtain redress for the denial of its statutory right to certification.
The court took jurisdiction and granted the relief sought.
It is questionable whether the court was correct in asserting jurisdiction.
The Board has been given broad discretion to regulate the election pro-
cedures of the NLRA. For the court to ground its argument as to violation of
the statutory mandate on the claimed imperative mood of the statutory term
"shall" is the height of literalism blind to the Board's discretion. The term
"shall" in the NLRA has almost unanimously been construed as permissive. 47
41
 Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 479, 481 (1964).
42
 67 L.R.R.M. 2361 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 1968).
48
 When the period for voting in a representation election is divided into sections in
order either to accommodate large numbers of voters or to cover multiple work shifts, the
election is called a "split election."
14 Among the cognoscenti, this case is referred to as "the beer-drinking case."
46 67 L.R.R.M. at 2363, quoting the Board's unreported opinion.
46
 29 U.S.C. § 159(0(1) states in pertinent part: "If the Board finds upon the record
of such hearing that such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by
secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof." (Emphasis added.)
47 Maritime Union v. NLRB, 267 F. Supp. 117, 121-24 & nn. 24-41, 65 L.R.R.M.
2065, 2068-69 & nn. 24-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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The court's reading of the statute further exhibits a lack of judicial respect
for the Board's expertise in election matters and for the Board's need to pre-
serve the integrity of its election process. Moreover, the union might well
have attempted to raise the correctness of the Board's decision in the
statutorily prescribed manner.48 The case, as it now stands, is an anomaly in
a carefully developed jurisdictional scheme and should not be followed."
In Maritime Union v. NLRB, 54 a federal district court took a far less
inflexible approach to the language of section 9(c) (I). The union filed a re-
presentation petition with the Board seeking certification as the representa-
tive of the clerical employees of the United Fruit Company at its terminal in
the Panama Canal Zone. The Board assumed the parties were within the Act's
definition of commerce but went on to decline jurisdiction, because pending
negotiations between the United States and Panama indicated a reasonable
probability that Panamanian sovereignty would soon be recognized, thus
expressly excluding the Canal Zone from the operation of the NLRA. The
union sought injunctive relief to compel the Board to process its representa-
tion petition. The union contended that section 9(c) (1) is mandatory, and
that if a petition is presented and a question of representation affecting
interstate commerce exists, the Board lacks discretion to deny an election.
Therefore, the union claimed, the Board's failure to process the representa-
tion question violated a statutory mandate. The court went directly to the
purported violation of statutory mandate and determined that section
9(c) (1) was discretionary, and that the Board's refusal to process was not a
violation of the statute' In addition, the court developed a distinction
between statutory prohibitions and statutory commands, as they relate to the
requisite violation of the statutory mandate. 52 Because a statutory pro-
hibition, as for example in Leedom, is clear on its face, while a statutory
command is susceptible of differing interpretation, it is easier in the case of
prohibition than in the case of command to establish the requisite violation
of statutory mandate and hence to establish district court jurisdiction. The
court in Maritime in effect articulated two previously obscure principles
with respect to district court jurisdiction: (1) that jurisdiction will not be
established when the Board has exercised its discretion, however unwise that
48
 The union could have requested bargaining with the employer, and if the em-
ployer refused to bargain, could have initiated a § 8(a) (5) unfair-labor-practice proceed-
ing. Admittedly, it is highly doubtful whether the general counsel would issue a § 8(a)(5)
complaint when confronted with the Board's decision on the petition to set the election
aside. Yet, the general counsel could disagree with the Board's interpretation of the section
and could issue the complaint. In any case, as a matter of exhausting the usual administra-
tive means of decision-making, the union at least should have made a request for bargain-
ing and, upon refusal of that request, should have filed a charge with the general counsel.
If the general counsel did issue a complaint, and the Board found no violation of § 8(a)
(5), then the union could have appealed pursuant to § 10(e) of the Act.
49 The Board, in an unreported supplemental decision, accepted the court's decision
and therefore certified the union. The probable reason for the Board's decision not to
appeal the jurisdictional decision is its satisfaction with the actual result of the case, the
union's certification.
80 267 F. Supp. 117, 65 L.R.R.M. 2065 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
51 Id. at 121-24 & nn. 24-41, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2068-69 & nn. 24-41.
82 Id. at 121 & n. 23, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2067 & n. 23.
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exercise may be; (2) that the negative or affirmative nature of the statute
is an important factor in deciding whether to establish jurisdiction.
Two other cases handed down during the past year illustrate the im-
munity of Board discretionary decisions from district court power. In
Hughes v. Getrcu, 5" an election which resulted in the establishment of a
broad production and maintenance unit was held invalid and set aside by
the Board. The union and the employer then consented to an election of a
considerably smaller unit, which excluded many of those employees included
in the original invalid unit. Subsequent to the voting in the second election,
which the union won, but prior to formal certification, eight employees in-
cluded in the original unit but excluded from the new unit, initiated a class
action in a federal district court seeking an injunction prohibiting the Board
from certifying the results of the election. The court assumed that the com-
plaining employees had no other means of obtaining judicial consideration
of the Board's endorsement of the smaller unit as appropriate for collective
bargaining. Nevertheless, the court refused to assert jurisdiction, because
the approval of a consent election agreement shaping a bargaining unit was
clearly a matter of Board expertise and discretion.
In Teamsters Local 690 v. NLRB, 5.1 the Board refused to sever an
alleged craft unit of lumber truckers and mechanics from a broader production
and maintenance unit of lumbermen. The craft union petitioned the federal
district court for an order setting aside the Board's decision and directing the
Board to conduct a representation election among the employees for whom
the craft unit was sought. The court refused to assert jurisdiction. The Ninth
Circuit assumed sub silentio that the complaining union had no other means
of judicial review within its control but nevertheless affirmed the court below.
The basis for the craft union's claim of violation of statutory mandate was
that the Board had made its prior determination of the appropriateness of the
broader unit a basis for the refusal to sever the craft, in express contravention
of the applicable portions of section 9(b) (2) of the NLRA. 5 .7. The Ninth
Circuit reviewed the Board-evolved principles of craft severance" and
determined that section 9(b) (2) could be violated only if the Board's pre-
vious appropriateness determination was its sole basis for refusal to sever.
Because the Board did not reject the craft unit sought based alone on the
previous determination, there could be no violation of the statutory mandate.
53 266 F. Supp. 15, 64 L.R.R.M. 2678 (D. Ohio 1967).
54
 375 F.2d 966, 64 L.R.R.M. 2662 (9th Cir. 1967).
55
 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (2) (1964) states in pertinent part:
The Board shalt decide in each case whether ... the unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant
unit, or subdivision thereof: Provided, That the Board shall not ... (2) decide
that any craft unit is inappropriate for such purposes on the ground that a
different unit has been established by a prior Board determination, unless a
majority of the employees in the proposed craft unit vote against separate
representation
56 See Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 64 L.R.R.M. 1011 (1966);
American Potash & Chem. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418, 33 L.R.R.M. 1380 (1954) ; Weyer-
haeuser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1076, 25 L.R.R.M. 1173 (1949) ; National Tube Co., 76
N.L.R.B. 1199, 21 L.R.R.M. 1292 (1948).
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Both the Hughes case and the Teamsters case graphically demonstrate that
a claim of abuse of discretion by the Board fails to satisfy the clear violation
of the NLRA requisite to the assertion of district court jurisdiction.
Since the decision of the Second Circuit in Fay v. Douds 57 not a single
district court has grounded its exercise of jurisdiction over Board repre-
sentational proceedings on the broad base of a "not transparently frivolous
assertion of constitutional violation." Both the Hughes case and the Teamsters
case indicate that the broad language of Fay continues to be read narrowly.
In both cases the plaintiffs asserted constitutional abuses. In Hughes, the
excluded employees claimed that the Board's refusal to hear their complaint
was a violation of due process. While the Board's refusal to grant a hearing
is probably not a violation of the fifth amendment, 58 the employees' claim
is not frivolous; many cases have considered the question whether an
administrative agency's refusal to grant a hearing is a violation of due
process.'"° The language of the Hughes case reflects a jurisdictional approach
qualitatively different from that of the Second Circuit in Fay, for the Hughes
court states that there must be "a fairly substantial allegation of denial of
constitutional rights before jurisdiction [will be] . . . assumed." 6° In the
Teamsters case, the Ninth Circuit rejected as frivolous the petitioning craft
union's assertion that a Board distinction between the lumber industry and
other industries for craft severance purposes was so arbitrary as to violate due
process. The union's assertion of arbitrariness was not transparently frivolous.
The Supreme Court has overturned as arbitrary other Board industrial
classifications." The fact that valid differences between the various in-
dustries may, upon consideration, be found to exist does not reduce an
arguable question of classification to prima facie absurdity. Here again, the
broad test of Fay was mitigated in application.
Another recent case has substituted an even more narrow standard for
the assertion of constitutional violations. In Greensboro Hosiery Mills v.
Johnston, 62
 the Board scheduled an election at the employer's plant. When
the regional director discovered that the employer had posted anti-union
notices, he directed their removal. The employer refused to remove them,
and the regional director thereupon rescheduled the election for a week later
than previously scheduled and off the employer's premises. The employer
instituted an action in a federal district court seeking an injunction against
the holding of the election on the ground that the regional director's order
infringed the employer's statutory and constitutional right to speak freely.
The district court took jurisdiction and granted the relief ,sought.G3
 The
Fourth Circuit reversed. In reversing, the court stated that district court
57 172 F.2d 720, 23 L.R.R.M. 2356 (2d Cir. 1949).
56 NLRB v. Simplot Co., 322 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1963) ; NLRB v. O.K. Van Storage,
Inc., 297 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1961).
59 See K. Davis, Administrative Law 135-68 (1965 ed.).
60 266 F. Supp. at 17, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2679.
61 Hotel Employees v. Leedom, 358 U.S. 99 (1958); Office Employees Int'l Union v.
NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957).
62 377 F.2d 28, L.R.R.M. 2299 (4th Cir. 1967).
63 The decision is unreported.
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jurisdiction could be found only if there was a "plain violation of a clear
constitutional limitation upon the conduct of the Board or the Regional
Director."" Hence, the Fourth Circuit has chosen a standard of jurisdiction
for constitutional violations equivalent to the Supreme Court's standard of
jurisdiction for statutory violations and has rejected the Second Circuit's
"not transparently frivolous" standard. Realistically, this represents a
recognition of the jurisdictional restraint unanimously exercised by the courts
under the "transparently frivolous" rubric. It also suggests that the additional
requisite established in Leedom—that there be no other mode of review
within the control of the petitioning party—may be extended to jurisdic-
tional assertions involving alleged constitutional deprivations. For example,
in Greensboro, the court might have refused jurisdiction because the employer
could have refused to bargain with the union and then could have defended
a section 8(a) (5) refusal-to-bargain charge on constitutional and statutory
free speech grounds.
In LaPlant v. McCulloch," the Third Circuit engrafted a still more
narrowing interpretation onto the Leedom jurisdictional prerequisite that
there be on other means of review within the control of the party seeking
adjudication of an alleged deprivation of statutory right. An understanding
of the decision in LaPlant requires consideration of a companion case, ITT
v. NLRB." In 1951, the Board, pursuant to its pre-Leedom practice,
certified a mixed unit of a predominantly professional composition without
the statutorily required polled consent of the professionals within the unit."
During the years after 1951, and even after the Leedom decision in 1958,
the union and the employer bargained collectively and reached agreement. In
1964, however, negotiations failed, and the union went out on strike. At this
juncture, the professional employees filed a decertification petition with the
Board, and the employer withdrew recognition of the union and filed election
petitions for both the mixed unit and the professionals. The union thereupon
initiated section 8(a)(1) and (5) unfair-labor-practice charges. The Board
dismissed both the employer's and the professionals' election petitions, on
the ground that they could not be considered pending the resolution of the
unfair-labor-practice charges. However, the Board's trial examiner invited
the professionals to intervene in the unfair-labor-practice proceeding against
the company. The professionals declined and initiated the LaPlant litigation
by filing a complaint in a federal district court, seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that the 1951 certification was void because it violated section 9(b) (1),
or, in the alternative, an order directing the Board to hold the petitioned-for
decertification election. The district court denied the relief sought, and
the Third Circuit affirmed.
64 377 F.2d at 32, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2302 (4th Cir. 1967).
no 382 F.2d 374, 65 L.R.R.M. 3049 (3d Cir. 1967).
66 382 F.2d 366, 65 L.R.R.M. 3002 (3d Cir. 1967).
67 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1) (1964) was enacted in order to protect minority groups of
professionals against unwanted inclusion in broader production and maintenance units.
The Board, therefore, did not require the polled consent of the professionals when they
were in the majority. Leedom v. Kyne, of course, brought this practice to a halt.
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In view of the fact that appellants had an available forum, the
National Labor Relations Board, in which to litigate the matter of
which they complained, with a right to review by this court, the
Supreme Court's decision in Leedom v. Kyne. . . , upon which the
appellants rely, does not support the claimed jurisdiction of the
district court to entertain this complaint. 68
The unfair-labor-practice forum would have been so unsuited to a fair
consideration of the professionals' claim that its availability should not have
foreclosed district court jurisdiction. The primary issue before the Board in
the unfair-labor-practice proceeding was whether for section 8(a) (5) purposes
the mixed unit was illegally formed. If the professionals had accepted the
invitation to intervene, their claim of illegal certification would have been
decided under the cloud of the employer's alleged refusal to bargain. The
Board could not be expected to conclude that the unit was legal for purposes
of the unfair-labor-practice proceeding but illegal for purposes of the profes-
sionals' representational rights. The probability is that the professionals
statutory rights would have been sacrificed rather than the union's bargaining
rights.
The Supreme Court spoke in Leedom of a meaningful mode of review
within the control of the party aggrieved by a Board representation decision.
The Court's emphasis was on the protection of congressionally created rights,
not on the mere availability of some forum. "If the absence of jurisdiction of
the federal courts meant a sacrifice or obliteration of a right which Congress
had created, the inference would be strong that Congress intended the
statutory provisions governing the general jurisdiction of the courts to
control."" It is submitted that the administrative forum afforded the profes-
sionals in LaPlant is as meaningless a mode of review as the complete denial
of forum to the professionals in Leedom. For this reason, the rationale of the
Third Circuit is erroneous and should not be followed.
Since the decision in Leedom v. Kyne, the Supreme Court has indicated
the desirability of narrow district court jurisdiction over Board proceed-
ings. 7° At the same time, even though having had the opportunity to do so
and having been urged to do so, the Court has refrained from eliminating
such jurisdiction. 71 Thus, the Court has indicated the proper balance to be
struck between administrative and judicial power in the labor law area. Dur-
ing the past year a good number of cases were added to the corpus of labor
jurisdictional law, almost all of which preserved the jurisdiction of the district
courts while narrowing it still further. Such a course of judicial conduct
appears to comport with the Supreme Court's conception of the interplay of
administrative and judicial law-making in the labor law field.
68 382 F.2d at 375, 65 L.R.R.M. 3049 (3d Cir. 1967).
69 358 U.S. at 190, quoting Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S.
297, 300 (1943).
70 Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964). See also Maritime Union v.
NLRB, 267 F. Supp. at 121 & n.20, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2067 & n.20.
71 Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. at 191 (dissenting opinion, Brennan, J.).
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B. The Three-Judge Federal Court and NLRB Proceedings
In Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vincent," a Board representation proceeding
pursuant to section 9(c) (1) was sought to be enjoined by the procedure of
a three-judge district court in accordance with section 2282 of the Judicial
Code.73 Subsequent to the initiation of a Board representation hearing,
petitioned for by the bargaining representatives of Utica's employees, Utica
brought action in a federal district court under Sections 1337 74 and 2282 of
the Judicial Code, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and claiming that
the provision in section 9(c) (1) that the hearing officer "shall not make any
recommendations [to the Board] with respect to [facts gathered by him in
representation proceedings]. . . "75 deprived Utica of a full and fair hearing
under the fifth amendment due process clause. The district court determined
that the complaint raised no substantial constitutional question and declined
to convene a three-judge court. 76 The Second Circuit affirmed.
Section 2282 of the Judicial Code is a procedural, not a jurisdictional
statute. The initial inquiry in every section 2282 proceeding is .whether there
is federal jurisdiction. 77 In most cases, jurisdiction is alleged under Section
1337 of the Judicial Code. Should the district court decide, as it often does,
that the alleged constitutional violation is not a substantial federal question,
it must refuse to convene the three-judge panel and dismiss the complaint.
In Utica, the employer made the argument that fifth amendment due
process required the Board either to have actually seen the witnesses in a
representation proceeding or to have been provided with a report as to their
credibility by one who has seen them. The employer contended that because
section 9(c) (1) states that "[s]uch hearing may be conducted by an officer or
employee of the regional office, who shall not make any recommendations
thereto. . ,"78
 it violates the fifth amendment.
The Second Circuit based its conclusion that the employer's constitutional
argument was insubstantial on two alternative rationales. First, even if labor
representational hearings do require trial-type hearings, due process does not
require an administrative subordinate to make recommendations, but rather
mandates only that "the officer who makes the determinations must consider
and appraise the evidence which justifies them." 79 Second, labor representa-
tional hearings are not trial-type hearings in a functional sense, but rather are
72
 375 F.2d 129, 64 L.R.R.M. 2631 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 839 (1967).
73 28
	 § 2282 (1964) states:
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation
or execution of any Act of Congress for repugnance to the Constitution of the
United States shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof unless
the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three
judges under section 2284 of this title.
74
 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1964).
75 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1964).
79 The decision is unreported.
TT California Water Serv. Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U.S. 252, 254-55 (1938); Ex
parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933); Wicks v. Southern Pac. Co., 231 F.2d 130, 37
L.R.R.M. 2725 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 946 (1956).
78 29 U.S.C. § 159(0 (1) (1964).
79 Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 482 (1936).
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investigatory hearings and hence require less by way of a due process
hearing.8 °
The Second Circuit commented on but did not reach the Board's
additional argument against jurisdiction in Utica.81 The Board argued that
even if the plaintiff employer's argument was well founded constitutionally,
sections 1337 and 2282 should be read together with the review procedures
of Section 9(d) of the NLRA. 82 Thus, the narrowing construction placed
on section 1337 in Leeclanz v. Kyne would also be placed on that section when
it is a jurisdictional basis for a section 2282 proceeding. Therefore, if a com-
plainant asserts a constitutional defect in the NLRA relating to Board re-
presentational proceedings, he must, in order to convene a three-judge district
court, show not only a substantial constitutional violation but also a lack of
other procedural means within his control to obtain judicial consideration
of the alleged violation. Such an integrated interpretation of Section 9(d) of
the NLRA and Sections 1337 and 2282 of the Judicial Code continues the
tradition established in Leedom v. Kyne of limited judicial involvement in
Board representational matters.
III: COLLATERAL ATTACK ON STATE VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL
LABOR SUPREMACY
The availability of the federal forum collaterally to attack state proceed-
ings which threaten the supremacy of federal labor law is limited by two
Supreme Court decisions construing Section 2283 of the Judicial Code, 83 the
federal anti-injunction statute. In Capital Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 84 an employer
sought a state court injunction against union secondary and informational
picketing" and at the same time applied to the Board for an unfair-labor-
practice complaint against the union because of alleged violations of Section
8(b) (4) of the NLRA. 8" The state court enjoined all of the union's picket-
ing.87 Shortly thereafter the Board issued a complaint charging the union
with illegal secondary picketing but refused to issue a complaint against
that portion of the union's picketing which sought merely to appeal to
customers and the general public. As required by Section 10(1) of the
NLRA," the Board petitioned a federal district court for an injunction
against the union's purportedly illegal secondary picketing, pending final
85 Inland Empire Dist. Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 706 (1945).
81
 375 F.2d at 134, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2635.
82 29 U.S.C. § 159(d) (1964).
83 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964) states: "A court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments."
84 347 U.S. 501 (1953).
85 The statutory distinction between secondary and informational picketing may be
discovered by .comparing 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (B) (1964) with the second proviso to
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1964).
88 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1964).
87 347 U.S. at 502.
88 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1964).
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decision by the Board on the merits of the section 8(b) (4) charge. 89 At the
same time, the Board filed a second suit in the same federal district court seek-
ing to enjoin the employer from enforcing the state court injunction. 90 In this
second litigation, the Board argued that the district court had jurisdiction
under section 1337 of the Judicial Code" to enjoin the state court's violation
of the Board's exclusive section 8(b) jurisdiction and of the federal district
court's exclusive section 10(1) jurisdiction. The employer argued that section
2283 was a bar to the injunctive relief sought by the Board. The district court
found jurisdiction, dispelled the section 2283 defense, and granted the relief
sought. 92
 The Ninth Circuit affirmed." The Supreme Court granted certiorari
limited to the jurisdictional issues 94 and held (1) that section 1337 con-
ferred jurisdiction on the district court, and (2) that an express exception to
section 2283 permitted the injunction to be granted. Section 2283 permits an
injunction to issue against state court proceedings when "in aid of" the
federal court's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reasoned that the district
court could enjoin the enforcement of the state court injunction "in aid of"
its section I0(1) jurisdiction to enjoin the union's picketing.
The state court injunction restrains conduct which the District
Court was asked to enjoin in the § 10(1) proceeding brought in the
District Court by the Board's Regional Director against the union.
In order to make the section 10(1) power effective the Board must
have authority to take all steps necessary to preserve its case. If
the state court decree were to stand, the Federal District Court
would be limited in the action it might take. If the Federal District
Court were to have unfettered power to decide for or against the
union, and to write such decree as it deemed necessary to effectuate
the policies of the Act, it must be freed of all restraints from the
other tribunal. To exercise its jurisdiction freely and fully it must
first remove the state decree. When it did so, it acted "where neces-
sary in aid of its jurisdiction."99
In Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman," an employer obtained
state court injunctive relief against organizational picketing conducted by
a union.91
 The employer's state court complaint stated facts which con-
stituted violations by the union of either Section 8 (b) (1) (a)° 8 or Section
8(b) (2) 99
 of the NLRA. The union, complaining that the Board had
89
 347 U.S. at 502-03.
99
 Id. at 503.
91
 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1964) states: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce
or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies."
92 347 U.S. at 504.
93 204 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1953).
94 346 U.S. 936 (1953).
95 347 U.S. at 505-06.
96 348 U.S. 511 (1955).
97 51 Ohio Op. 145, 116 N.E. 2d 60 (Cuyahoga County CP. 1953).
98 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1)(a) (1964).
99 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1964).
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exclusive jurisdiction over the conduct complained of in the state court
action, instituted a suit in a federal district court to enjoin the state court
proceedings. 1°° The union argued that district court jurisdiction existed
under section 1337, and that section 2283 was not a bar.'°' The federal
district court held that section 2283 was a bar to the requested injunctive
relief, and that the union's action did not come within the "in aid of"
jurisdiction exception to section 2283. 102 The Sixth Circuit103 and the Supreme
Court affirmed.'" In response to the union's argument that the district
court should be able to enjoin the state court proceeding "in aid of" federal
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court stated:
In no lawyerlike sense can the present proceeding be thought to be
in aid of the District Court's jurisdiction. Under no circumstances
has the District Court jurisdiction to enforce rights and duties
which call for recognition by the Board. Such non-existent jurisdic-
tion therefore cannot be aided.1°5
Reading Capital Service and Richman as a composite exposition of
federal district court jurisdiction in the labor preemption context, several
propositions must be taken as established. First, an action to prohibit a state
from regulating labor disputes arguably within the NLRA is a "civil action
or proceeding arising under an act of Congress regulating commerce. "106
Hence, the federal district courts always have original jurisdiction of such
suits under section 1337 of the Judicial Code. Second, section 2283 is appli-
cable and may operate as a bar to the exercise of injunctive relief, as in
Richman. The Richman decision rejected the argument that section 2283
ought not to be applied where the federal jurisdiction over the subject matter
in question, here the regulation of labor disputes affecting commerce, was
exclusive of and not concurrent with state jurisdiction. 107 Third, the prohibi-
tion of section 2283 can be avoided only if there exists federal district court
jurisdiction to enforce rights and duties created by the NLRA,'° 8 which juris-
diction is aided by an injunction against the state proceeding. The Richman
court rejected an argument by analogy from Section 1651 of the Judicial
100 348 U.S. at 513.
101 Also, the union argued the merits of its preemption complaint. Because of their
disposition of the case on the jurisdictional question, none of the courts ever reached
the preemption issue. All of the courts did assume arguendo, however, that the union's
preemption argument was correct.
102 348 U.S. at 513. See Note, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 426 (1956).
103 211 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1954).
104 348 U.S. 511 (1955).
105 Id. at 519.
106 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1964). Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman, 348 U.S.
at 521 (dissenting opinion, Warren, C.J.);•CapitaI Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. at 504;
International Union of Elec. Workers, CIO v. Underwood Corp., 219 F.2d 100 (2d Cir.
1955).
107 348 U.S. at 521 (dissenting opinion, Warren, C.J.). Id. at 524 (dissenting opinion,
Douglas, J.). See Kochery, Conflict of Jurisdiction: 28 U.S.C. § 2283 and Exclusive
Federal Jurisdiction, 4 Buffalo L. Rev. 269 (1956); Note, The Supreme Court, 1954 Term,
69 1-larv. L. Rev. 119, 180 (1955).
108 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(1),( 1) (1964).
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Code that the federal district court could issue an injunction in aid of the
potential jurisdiction either of the Board to enforce rights and duties created
by the NLRA or of the circuit courts of appeals to enforce, upon petition by
the Board 1 °9 or by any aggrieved party, 11 ° rights and duties created by the
NLRA. 111
 Furthermore, Richman recognized sub silentio that section 1337
jurisdiction to prohibit state court interference with the supremacy of federal
law cannot be jurisdiction to be aided within the meaning of the exception to
section 2283, because such a reading would render section 2283 meaning-
less." :2
During the past year, the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware was presented with a case of the Capital Service-Richman variety.
In Delaware Coach Co. v. Public Serv. Comnen,lla the employer, a public
transportation company in the city of Wilmington, was unable to reach agree-
ment with the union representing its employees. The union struck, and
Wilmington lost its only mass transit facilities. After a lengthy period of
time, during which more than 50 fruitless bargaining sessions occurred, the
state's public utilities commission issued an order to Delaware Coach to
show cause why its operating certificate should not be revoked. The com-
pany entered a limited appearance to challenge the Commission's jurisdiction
on the ground that such jurisdiction was violative of the federal preemption
doctrine. The Commission denied the company's motion to dismiss, and the
company immediately sought injunctive relief in the federal district court.
The Commission, now defendant in the district court suit, moved to dismiss
on the basis that section 2283 was a bar. The court denied the motion to
dismiss and held that section 2283 was not a bar 114 because (1) an adminis-
trative decision to revoke a certificate of operation is not a state court
proceeding within the meaning of section 2283,111 and (2) even if section
2283 is applicable to state administrative proceedings, the injunction should
issue "in aid of" the court's implied section 1337 jurisdictionll" to protect the
109 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964).
110 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964).
111 We have been referred by petitioner to decisions in the lower federal courts
under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 and its antecedents holding that the Court of Appeals
may resort to writ of mandamus or prohibition "in aid of its jurisdiction" to
prevent a district court from acting in a manner which would defeat the Court
of Appeals' power of review. These decisions might be more relevant had the
injunction been sought from the Court of Appeals. Only that court has power to
review decisions of the Board. In any event, it has never been authoritatively
suggested that this example of injunctive aid to a potential jurisdiction, which
finds roots in traditional concepts of the relationship between inferior and
superior courts of the same judicial system, has any relevance where the offending
action sought to be enjoined is insulated by two intervening and essentially
unrelated systems, one of an administrative rather than judicial nature, the
other the manifestation of a distinct sovereign authority.
348 U.S. at 519 n,5.
112 Kochery, supra note 107, at 279 & n.60.
113 265 F. Supp. 648, 64 L.R.R.M. 2635 (D. Del. 1967).
114 The court, therefore, reached the merits of the company's preemption argument.
265 F. Supp. at 654, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2640.
115 Id. at 651-53, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2638-39.
Hu It should be noted that this § 1337 jurisdiction is in addition to the § 1337 juris-
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federal rights created by the NLRA but not given expressly to the Board to
protect.
In order to reach its alternative holding on the jurisdictional question,
the court was called upon to distinguish Richman's rationale that exclusive
jurisdiction to enforce the NLRA was given in both explicit and limited terms
to the Board" and the federal courts, 118 and that in the absence of a specific
grant of federal jurisdiction, section 2283 was a bar to district court injunc-
tive relief. To distinguish Richman, the court read it narrowly. In Richman,
said the court, the complaining union was seeking protection against a section
8(a) (1) unfair labor practice—the employer's filing of a state court suit in
order to harass the union's organizational efforts. No jurisdiction existed in
the federal court in Richman, because only the Board has power to remedy
unfair labor practices. Thus, Richman's rationale extended only to cases in
which a party to a labor dispute tried to substitute federal court jurisdiction
for Board jurisdiction to deal with unfair labor practices. Because the instant
case concerned not an unfair labor practice but only a "possible interference
with collective bargaining, ,)119 by a third party state agency not within the
NLRA, the Board's exclusive jurisdiction to deal with unfair labor practices
could not be violated. At the same time, collective-bargaining rights guar-
anteed by the Act, such as the right to bargain to an impasse in good faith, 12"
clearly exist and require protection. The court, therefore, determined that the
section 1337 jurisdiction of the federal courts could be the basis for enforcing
rights created by the NLRA, if the Board lacked express authority to protect
those rights.' 21 Once having established that jurisdiction, the court held that
it was jurisdiction exclusive in the federal court which could and should be
aided by an injunction against state interference, and which, therefore, fell
within section 2283's exception. 122
The Delaware court's use of section 1337 federal jurisdiction to enforce
rights created by the NLRA but not explicitly protectable by the Board or
diction which supported the preemption jurisdictional arguments in Capital Service and
Richman. That § 1337 jurisdiction was jurisdiction to prohibit a state from regulating
labor disputes arguably within the NLRA. See note 106 supra and accompanying text.
It can never be jurisdiction to be aided within the meaning of § 2283. See note 112 supra
and accompanying text. This § 1337 jurisdiction is jurisdiction to treat substantive labor
matters covered by the NLRA, but not given to the Board to regulate.
117 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a), (b), 159(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), 160(a), (c), (e) (1964).
118 29 U.S.C. §§ 160 (j), (1) (1964).
119 265 F. Supp. at 654, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2639.
120 See NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
121 The parties to a labor dispute have a right, indeed a duty, to engage in col-
lective bargaining, under the federal statutes. The protection of collective bar-
gaining is not entrusted to the NLRB as is jurisdiction over unfair labor practice
charges. Therefore, the federal courts have jurisdiction to protect the rights ac-
corded the parties by federal statutes.
265 F. Supp. at 654, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2640.
122 Essential to the protection of the right to free and unfettered collective bar-
gaining in this case is an injunction against further proceedings before the Del-
aware Public Service Commission. Therefore, the injunction sought is necessary
in aid of the jurisdiction of this court, and the prohibition of § 2283 does not
apply.
265 F. Supp. at 654, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2640.
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the federal courts should be carefully considered. 123 Because the NLRA sets
out specific administrative and judicial means by which rights and duties
established by the Act are to be enforced, the inference is strong that rights
created by the Act were intended to be enforced solely by those means. 124
This is especially so in light of the general policy against the enforcement of
labor rights by federal court injunction. 125
 Moreover, the Richman case was
not limited to the situation where the rights sought to be protected were
explicitly given to the Board or to the federal courts to protect.'" Richman
goes further. Its clear suggestion is that the enforcement of the federal act is
allocated to a specialized administrative body, and that rights created by the
NLRA are better left unprotected than protected by many other nonspecial-
ized tribunals. The fact that the various federal courts will be defining and
describing rights to be protected by the NLRA does increase the probability
that there will be conflicting decisions on the same substantive Jaws." But
conflict between various lawmaking bodies over the nature and scope of
legislatively created rights is not necessarily an evil." This is especially so
when the substantive law to be so disparately evolved is no more suited to the
administrative law-making of a single body than to the judicial law-making of
many bodies,'" and when a single supreme body exists which has the power
and the competence to resolve any truly serious conflict. 1 " And when the risk
of incongruity in the law, resulting from allegedly conflicting decisional de-
velopment is weighed against the lack of protection of a clearly recognized and
fundamental federal right, it seems correct to give preference to the right
and exercise the federal commerce jurisdiction in its behalf." It is submitted,
therefore, that on balance the Delaware court was quite correct in establishing
section 1337 jurisdiction to protect the company's right to engage in collective
bargaining free of coercion, and in aiding that jurisdiction by enjoining the
state commission.
The significance of Delaware Coach is not solely that the court created
section 1337 jurisdiction to protect rights established by the NLRA, but that
it did so in order to circumvent Richman and avoid section 2283's prohibition.
The anti-Richman animus, implicit in Delaware Coach and explicit in some
123 The court treated this question scantily.
124
 Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 167 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1948).
126
 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964). See Note, supra note 25, at 184.
126
 348 U.S. at 520 & n.6 (1955).
127 For example, there has been and is conflict among the circuits and between the
various circuits and the Board concerning the interpretation and application of many
sections of the NLRA.
12 9
 Cf. H.M. Hart & A.M. Sacks, The Legal Process 2177-417 (Tent. Ed. 1958).
• 120
 The NLRA itself assumes the competence of the various federal courts in defining,
describing, and protecting labor rights and duties, for it both sets up a scheme of judicial
enforcement of Board decrees, 29 U.S.C. $§ 160(e), (f) (1964), and grants original juris-
diction to the federal district courts to treat labor questions. 29 U.S.C. 160(j)1 ( 1),185, 187 (1964).
1so One important basis for the Supreme Court's certiorari. policy is a conflict be-
tween the circuits. See Rule 19(1) (b), Rev. Rules of the Supreme Court of the United
States, 388 U.S. 927, 948 (1967).
181 See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); Texas & New Orleans R.R. v.
Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
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court decisions' 32 and legal commentaries' 33 rests on a pragmatic considera-
tion: if a state court or agency violates the supremacy of federal labor law,
by the time relief can be obtained through the usual appellate procedures,""
relief is useless.135 It was just this consideration that moved Mr. Chief
Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas in their separate dissenting opinions
in Richman to suggest that section 2283 is simply inapplicable where state
proceedings infringe upon exclusive federal jurisdiction.'" As long as that
view retains its minority status, federal courts, like the Delaware Coach court,
will continue to stretch to establish some federal jurisdiction over rights
created by the NLRA and will continue to aid that jurisdiction, thus avoiding
section 2283. 137
WALTER F. KELLY, JR.
132 See International Union of Elec. Workers, CIO v. Underwood Corp., 219 F.2d
at 103.
133 E.g., Kochery, supra note 107; Note, 41 U. Va. L. Rev. 815 (1955).
134 The usual appellate procedures involve appeals to the intermediate and highest
state courts, followed by an application to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari,
which may or may not be granted, followed by Supreme Court litigation.
135 See International Union of Elec. Workers, CIO v. Underwood Corp., 219 F.2d
at 103.
136 348 U.S. at 521 (dissenting opinion, Warren, C. J.). Id. at 524 (dissenting opin-
ion, Douglas, J.). See Kochery, supra note 107.
137 Whether the right of parties to a labor dispute, arguably within the federal labor
laws, to be free from state labor regulation is a right within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1964) has never been decided. See American Fed'n of Labor v. Watson, 327
U.S. 582, 590-91 (1946). Nor has the question of whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) is an
exception to 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964) ever been decided. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390
U.S. 611, 613-14 n.3 (1968). If it were decided that a right to be free from state
labor regulation is a right within the meaning of § 1983 and that § 1983 is an exception to
§ 2283, then state courts or agencies could be enjoined from violating the preemption
doctrine.
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